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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through Utah State Department 
of Social Services, 
Case No. 18988 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JOHN DICK, 
Defendant/Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This Interlocutory Appeal concerns the conflicting overlapping 
original jurisdictions of the juvenile and district courts where 
a minor has been charged with violations of the Utah Uniform Act 
on Paternity (Sections 78-45a-l et U.C.A. (1953)). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
In district court, the State of Utah filed a civil action 
against Appellant. The State sought child support from the Appellant 
pursuant to the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity. Appellant specially 
appeared to contest the district court's jurisdiction and to seek 
removal of the action to the juvenile court. Appellant's "Motion 
for an Order Releasing Jurisdiction to the Juvenile Court" was 
denied in an Order dated January 24, 1983 and signed by Judge 
Timothy R. Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the district court's Order on the 
grounds that the letter and spirit of the Utah Juvenile Court 
Act (Sections 78-3a-l et U.C.A. (1953)) require that the 
juvenile court exercise exclusive, original jurisdiction where a 
minor is accused of violations of the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Absence of Record. 
There is virtually no record in this Interlocutory Appeal 
other than the Complaint, Appellant's Motion for removal, and the 
district court's Order denying that Motion. No stenographic record 
was taken at the hearing on Appellant's Motion. 
B. Minimal Facts. 
On August 9, 1982, sixteen-year-old Renee Gentilin gave birth 
to an illegitimate son, Jeremy. Three months later, the State of 
Utah, through its department of social services, filed the Complaint 
herein. The Complaint alleges that the Appellant, John L. Dick, 
has violated the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity in the matter of 
Renee and Jeremy Gentilin. The Complaint charges the Appellant with 
the expenses of Renee's pregnancy and birth and with the ongoing 
support of her son, Jeremy. 
Appellant has not yet answered the Complaint. However, he will 
admit to having had sexual relations with Renee approximately nine 
months before the birth of Jeremy. At that specific time--in the 
-2-
autumn of 1981--the Appellant was barely fifteen years old. 
C. Undocumented Assertions of Fact. 
Appellant wishes to present to the Court certain undocumented 
assertions of fact relating to his personhood. Fully and openly 
labeled as such, they are as follows: 
John Dick's father and mother were married in 1962. It was 
his father's first marriage and his mother's second marriage. The 
latter already had two sons by a previous husband. 
John was born in August, 1966. Subsequently, a younger sister 
was born. 
His parents' marriage was stormy. It was marked by tension and 
quarrels. John's mother allegedly was psychologically unstable. 
Allegedly she tried to commit suicide while John was an infant. 
During John's lifetime, his parents separated three times: in 1967, 
in 1974 and again in 1975. Although he was still quite young, John's 
school work and personality were affected: he constantly quarreled 
with his classmates. 
In September, 1976, when John had just turned ten, his parents 
divorced. John's mother was awarded custody of the children. She 
moved with them to Farmington, Utah. A little over a year later, 
she remarried a divorced gentleman. 
John's stepfather was a cruel disciplinarian. He repeatedly 
beat John (and John's older half-brother) with instruments such as 
saws and belts. John was affected. At school he had problems 
learniny the basics; several tutors were required. Twice he ran 
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away from home. 
Because of the repeated physical abuse of John by his stepfathn 
John's biological father obtained a Modification of the Decree of 
Divorce in September, 1979. At John's own request, custody was 
transferred to his father. 
In the interim, John's father had remarried and had had two 
daughters. Barely thirteen years old, John moved into his father's 
household in West Jordan. [It may be noted that, in all, John has 
one "whole-sibling," five half-siblings and ten step-siblings.] 
The move to West Jordan was traumatic. Although John got along 
well with his stepmother, he did not get along with his half-sisters. 
Moreover, within a short period, relations with his father grew 
strained. At school, the level of John's work, which was already 
poor, eroded further. A tutor was engaged. The boy received 
psychiatric therapy. 
In April, 1981, when he was fourteen, John ran away from home. 
After four days, John's father discovered his son's whereabouts and 
prevailed upon him to return. It is alleged that John had first had 
sexual relations with Renee Gentilin during this interval. 
That summer, John lived in a children's camp, where he helped 
with the horses and did odd jobs. Upon returning home in July, he 
immediately began attending rodeos across the state: he was away 
from home every weekend. 
In August, when he turned fifteen, John again ran away from 
home. It was discovered that he was living with a friend, Scott. 
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John's father acquiesced and allowed the boy to remain there. For 
11varly two months, John lived with his friend and with his friend's 
three Drothers and sisters and his friend's mother. John's parents 
contributed to his support. 
Ultimately, however, the friend's influence was bad. Assertedly, 
petty crimes were being committed, and the boys' life-style was 
unruly. John's school work deteriorated further. 
In October, 1981, John returned home. In early November he had 
a single encounter with Renee Gentilin. At high school he received 
extensive counseling. He would, nevertheless, fail a number of 
courses. On August 9, 1982, two days before John's sixteenth 
birthday, Renee gave birth to a child. 
POINT I. 
ARGUMENT 
The Utah Juvenile Court Act 
Unequivocably Mandates That 
The Juvenile Court Exercise 
Exclusive Original Jurisdic-
tion in the Instant Action. 
A. Section 78-3a-16(1) of the Act is clear and unequivocal. 
Section 78-3a-16(1) U.C.A. (1953), reads as follows: "Except 
as otherwise provided by law, the [juvenile] court shall have exclu-
sive original jurisdiction in proceedings: (1) Concerning any child 
who has violated any federal, state or local law or municipal 
')rd1nance [The exception created by the first six words 
will be discussed below in Point II.] 
The language is straightforward and unambiguous. It 
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obviously means this: Whenever a child has violated any state 
law, exclusive original jurisdiction vests in the juvenile court. 
B. Where statutory language is clear, that statute must be 
interpreted to mean precisely what it says. 
"[T]here is nothing to construe where there is no ambiguity in 
the statute." State v. Archuletta, 526 P.2d 911, 912 (Utah 1974). 
[A statute] carries with it the presumptions 
that it is valid, and that the words and phrases 
were chosen advisedly to express the legislative 
intent. . The statute should not be applied 
other than in accordance with its literal word-
ing unless it is so unclear or confused as to 
be wholly beyond reason, or inoperable, or it 
contravenes some basic constitutional right. 
Gord v. Salt Lake City, 434 P.2d 449, 451, 20 
Utah 2d 138 (1967). 
See, also, Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 485 P.2d 1035, 1036, 
26 Utah 2d 100 (1971). 
C. A gloss that would limit the juvenile court's jurisdiction 
to only "criminal" laws should not be read into the statute. 
(1) It is against policy. This Court has addressed the matter: 
It is often said that it should be assumed 
that all of the words used in a statute were 
used advisedly and were intended to be given 
meaning and effect. For the same reason, 
the omissions should likewise be taken note 
of and given effect. Kennecott 
v. Anderson, 514 P.2d 217, 219, 32;Utah 2d 
102 (1973). [Footnotes omitted] 
1. The second sentence in the Kennecott decision, above, is 
drawn from a 1929 California case which merits direct cita-
tion: "We [the California court] may not, therefore, under 
the guise of interpretation read into a statute matters 
which have been omitted by the Legislature particularly 
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(2) Other states have statutes similar to Utah's. Not only 
is it improper, pursuant to this Court's policy, to introduce a 
restrictive gloss into Paragraph 78-3a-16(1) of the Juvenile Court 
Act. Additionally, it would be senseless to do so, because other 
states operate under statutes worded very similarly to Utah's. 
For example: 
In Hawaii the family court has exclusive jurisdiction over 
children who have committed "a violation or attempted violation of 
any federal, state or local law or municipal ordinance." Section 
571-11, (F), Hawaii Code Annotated. 
In Illinois the juvenile court has jurisdiction over children 
under seventeen who have "violated or attempted to violate any 
federal or state law or municipal ordinance." Section 37-702-2, 
Illinois Code Annotated. 
In Louisiana the juvenile courts have exclusive original juris-
diction in proceedings concerning any child "who violates any law 
or ordinance . Section 13:570, Revised Statutes of Louisiana. 
In Michigan the juvenile division of the probate court has 
exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child under 
seventeen years of age "who has violated any municipal ordinance or 
law of the state or of the United States Section 27.3178 
(598.2(1)), Michigan Code Annotated. 
where it appears that the omission might have been inten-
tional . In re Barnett's Estate, 275 P. 453, 455-56 
(Cal. App. 1929). 
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In Minnesota the juvenile court has exclusive, oriyinal juris-
diction, with certain exceptions, in proceedinys where a [delinquent] 
child "has violated any state or local law." Section 260.015, 
Minnesota Code Annotated. 
In Pennsylvania the juvenile court has full and exclusive jur-
isdiction in proceedings affecting a [delinquent] child who "has 
violated any law of the Commonwealth or ordinance of any city, 
borough or township Section 11-243 (4) (a), Pennsylvania 
Code Annotated. 
In South Carolina the family court system has exclusive, origi-
nal jurisdiction, with certain exceptions, in proceedings concerning 
any child "who is alleged to have violated . any state or local 
law or municipal ordinance . Section 20-7-400 A. (1) (d) . 11 
Thus, the Juvenile Court Act should be read and applied 
exactly as it is written. Section 78-3a-16(1) requires that the 
juvenile court exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where a 
minor--such as Appellant herein--has violated any state law, in-
1. Certain other states had statutes that read similarly to 
Utah's but have recently amended those statutes to restrict 
the juvenile court's jurisdiction to violations of soecifi-
cally criminal laws. See, for example, Florida Code Annotated, 
939.01(8) amended to §39.01(33); Iowa Code Annotated, 
13232.2(13) (a) amended to 232.2(11); Mississippi Cod2 Annotated, 
§43-21-5 amended to §43-21-105. Such modifications support 
Appellant's argument that unmodified codes, such as Utah's, 
are intended to mean precisely what they say: i.e., that 
jurisdiction extends to violations of civil as well as of 
criminal laws. 
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a noncriminal law like the Uniform Act on Paternity. 
Unfortunately, however, section 78-3a-16 of the Juvenile Court 
Act is complicated by the inclusion of a limiting phrase: "Except 
as otherwise provided by law . It is to the meaning and 
application of this phrase that we now turn. 
POINT II. Where the Juvenile Court Act 
and the Uniform Act on Pa-
ternity Establish Overlapping 
Jurisdictions, the Mandate 
of the Juvenile Court Act 
Must Prevail. 
A. The Uniform Act on Paternity and the Juvenile Court Act 
set jurisdiction in conflicting courts. 
The case at bar was brought against plaintiff pursuant to the 
Uniform Act on Paternity, Sections 48-45a-l et seq., U.C.A. (1953). 
Section 48-45a-5(1) begins as follows: "The district court has 
jurisdiction of an action under this act . . 
On the other hand, the Appellant was, variously, fifteen and 
sixteen years of age when he allegedly violated the above state 
law. Pursuant to Section 78-3a-16(1) of the Juvenile Court Act, 
the juvenile court has exclusive, original jurisdiction where a 
child has violated any state law. 
Thus, it must be decided which of two conflicting statutes 
B. Precedents concerning traffic violations by minors support 
contention that the juvenile court, and not the district 
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court, should exercise jurisdiction in the instant mattvr. 
CU Dimmitt v. City Court of Salt Lake City. A somewhat analo-
gous pair of cases reached the Utah Supreme Court in 1968 and 1971. 
In Dimmitt v. City Court of Salt Lake City, 444 P.2d 461, 462, 
21 Utah 2d 257 (1968), a juvenile defendant protested the juris-
diction of the city court following a traffic violation. The Utah 
Supreme Court focused on the introductory, limiting phrase of 
Section 78-3a-16 of the Juvenile Court Act, which phrase gives 
the juvenile court original exclusive jurisdiction "[e]xcept as 
otherwise provided by law." The Court phrased the issue thus: 
"The pertinent inquiry is whether it is in fact 'otherwise provided 
by law' that the juvenile court does not have exclusive jurisdic-
tion of traffic violations." 
The decision in Dimmitt was split: two justices signed the 
plurality opinion; one concurred in the result; one dissented; and 
one neither concurred nor dissented, suggesting that the case "stands 
for nothing." (p. 464) Three justices held that the city court 
did have jurisdiction to try juveniles charged with traffic offenses 
under city ordinances despite the fact that both courts, under 
statute, had been given exclusive original jurisdiction. Signifi-
cantly, the plurality opinion reasoned from the fact that the 
Juvenile Court Act itself listed specific exceptions for traffic 
violations (§78-3a-44 (4)) and for felonies (§78-3a-25) .
11 
Addi-
1. Today's section numbers are used. At the time of Qimmitt the 
act was otherwise designated in the code. 
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tionally, the Court put forward common-sense reasons why the legis-
lature, in passing the Juvenile Court Act, might have intended 
traffic violations to be treated differently and to be handled in 
uther courts. For example, such violations were in the nature of 
errors in violating traffic rules; minors had to be at least sixteen 
and one-half years of age before driving; and in doing so they 
were exercising the privileges of adults. (p. 462.) 
The case at bar, on the other hand, is distinguishable from 
Dimmitt. The case at bar concerns, not a traffic-rule violation, 
bul a violation of the Uniform Act on Paternity. Although the 
Juvenile Court Act makes a specific exception of traffic violations, 
nowhere does it assert that paternity or support matters may consti-
tute an exception to its exclusive original jurisdiction over minors. 
Moreover, whereas the juvenile courts are statutorily given 
exclusive, original jurisdiction, the Uniform Act on Paternity 
(unlike the City Court Act in Dimmitt) does not give the district 
courts specifically exclusive or specifically original jurisdiction. 
To the degree that Dimmitt is relevant, that earlier case should 
guide this Court to hold that it is not "otherwise provided by law" 
that the juvenile court shall not have exclusive original jurisdic-
tion in paternity actions. 
(2) Nelson v. Green. Nelson v. Green, 479 P.2d 480, 482, 25 
Utah 2d 219 (1971), concerned another traffic violation by a minor. 
1'he Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed the Dimmitt holding, again in a 
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split decision. Justice Henriod, dissenting and concurring in 
part, stated: 
This case is about as confusing as Dimmitt 
v. City Court of Salt Lake City. It is high 
time that the legislature coordinate the 
functions of the courts as they apply to 
juveniles, and eliminate the overlapping 
inconsistencies between the juvenile court 
nad general legislation . 
The Nelson decision reinforces Appellant's position that, 
whereas traffic violations may be adjudicated elsewhere than in the 
juvenile court, paternity actions involving a minor must be adjudi-
cated only in the juvenile court. The implied test in Nelson and 
Dimmitt was this: Did the Juvenile Court Act itself provide for 
concurrent or alternate jurisdiction in some other court? If yes, 
then another court might hear the case. Applying that test to the 
case at bar, one concludes that, because the Juvenile Court Act 
does not provide for paternity actions' being adjudicated in some 
other court, paternity actions must be tried exclusively and origin-
ally in the juvenile court pursuant to Section 78-3a-16. 
C. Practice indicates that certain statutory jurisdictional 
assignments must be disregarded where they conflict with the 
Juvenile Court Act. 
Implicit in the Dimmitt case, above, and obvious from practice 
in this state is the following rule: Where a statute may assign 
jurisdiction to one court or another but fails to refer specifically 
to minors, that statute should not be followed when it conflicts 
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with the jurisdictional mandate of the Juvenile Court Act. 
The Juvenile Court Act was passed in 1965. At that time, and 
for many years thereafter, the Justices' Courts and the City Courts 
were, by statute, given jurisdiction over class B and class C 
misdemeanors (§1bB-4-16 and 78-5-4, U.C.A. (1953)'. Nevertheless, 
such violations by minors were and have been commonly handled in 
the juvenile courts. Indeed, pursuant to Section 78-3a-18 of the 
Juvenile Court Act, such violations are specifically required to 
be transferred to the juvenile court where they have been started 
in any other court. 
In 1977, when the state's judiciary was reorganized and the 
city courts were transformed into circuit courts, the latter's 
jurisdiction in criminal matters was specifically limited to 
persons eighteen years of age and older (§78-4-5(1) U.C.A. (1953)). 
In other words, the legislature formalized in writing what had 
been normal practice for already a dozen years. 
Thus, it can be seen that the mere statutory assignment of 
jurisdiction to a district or circuit court (or to city or justices' 
courts) has not, historically, been followed where such assignments 
have conflicted with the Juvenile Court Act. Such broad jurisdic-
tional assignments to the district or to lower courts have been 
interpreted--in practice--to mean nothing more than an intended 
division of authority between the senior and junior courts of this 
state. 
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D. Utah courts are required by law to construe a statute to 
·effect the purpose of that statute. 
"(U]nder the provisions of Section 68-3-2, U.C.A., 1953, we are 
required to construe liberally all statutes with a view to effect 
the objects of the statutes and to promote justice." State v. Hunt, 
368 P.2d 261, 262, 13 Utah 2d 32 (1962). Application of Section 
68-3-2 (and of its predecessor forms) is mandatory. (Hammond. v. 
Wall, 171 P. 148, 151, 51 Utah 464 (1918) .) "The fundamental 
consideration which transcends all others in regard to the inter-
pretation and application of a statute is: What was the intent of 
the legislature?" Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 411 P.2d 831, 
832, 17 Utah 2d 337 (1966). 
(A] statute should be considered in the 
light of its background and purpose; and 
also in connection with other aspects of 
the law which have a bearing on the prob-
lem in order that its intent and purpose 
be fulfilled. Dimmitt v. City Court of 
Salt Lake City, 444 17.2d 461, 464, 21 Utah 2d 257 (1968). 
Hence, the arbiter of the instant conflict must address the 
purposes or intents of the two conflicting statutes under review. 
E. The purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is rehabilitative 
rather than punitive. 
Section 78-3a-l, U.C.A. (1953), sets forth the purposes of the 
Juvenile Court Act. Those purposes include the following: 
1. Footnote omitted. This citation is drawn from Justice Callister's 
dissent wherein he asserts that the juvenile court should have 
exercised original jurisdiction in the matter of a traffic 
violation by a minor. 
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To secure for each child coming before 
the juvenile court such care, guidance, 
and control, preferably in his own home, 
as will serve his welfare and the best 
interests of the state . To this 
end this act shall be liberally construed. 
The Utah Supreme Court has refined upon these purposes: 
"Embodied in [the juvenile court system] is a policy of allowing a 
person to enter adult life free of a record of youthful indiscre-
tions." State v. Mcclendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980). "The 
main objective [of juvenile proceedings] is to inquire into bad be-
havior and its causes and to seek remedies and adjustments in the 
child, rather than merely to accuse, convice and punish him." In re 
Lindh, 359 P.2d 1058, 1059, 11 Utah 2d 385 (1961). "The [juvenile] 
court is sort of a substitute parent and the proceedings, as pro-
vided by our statutes, are not criminal in nature but are inquiries 
into the interest of the juvenile." Velasquez v. Pratt, 443 P.2d 
1020, 1021, 21 Utah 2d 229 (1968). 
Although the preceding citations bear upon criminal matters, 
they show, nevertheless, that the overriding philosophy behind the 
juvenile court system is to rehabilitate the child rather than to 
mechanically impose upon the child whatever punishment, retribution, 
ammcnds or "civil responsibilities" may be felt by society to 
befit that child's errant behavior. 
F. The purpose of the Uniform Act on Paternity is to exact 
from the parents of illegitimate offspring. 
The purpose of the paternity act is, apparently, to oblige the 
-15-
parents of illegitimate offspritFJ tu s111>pu1t these ofEsp1-ing on a 
par with their support of legitimate offspring. Although not 
technically punitive in nature, and certainly not criminal, the 
act is, nevertheless, fraught with references to liability, bonds, 
judgments and enforcement. Its overall posture is mechanistic and 
unyielding. Nowhere does it refer to the age, status or background 
of the parents. Because the underlying policy is society's deter-
mination that the parents--and not the state--shall support ille-
gitimate offspring, the statute has, in practice, both adminis-
tratively and judicially, been applied so as to impose the statu-
tory liability solely on the basis of the parents' ability to pay. 
G. By properly construing both relevant statutes, this Court 
should hold that the juvenile court must exercise exclusive origi-
nal jurisdiction over the Appellant. 
The liberal construction of a statute to effect its purposes, 
which construction is required by law (§68-3-2, §78-3a-l, U.C.A. 
(1953)), must begin, logically, with a jurisdictional analysis. A 
party denied entry to a court is denied, ipso facto, that court's 
remedies. Without access, a court is but a phantom court. 
In the case at bar, let us assume that the Appellant is found 
to be the father. 
Should the district court maintain its jurisdiction, then that 
court would respond within the rigid provisions of the Uniform Act 
on Paternity. It would impose ongoing liability upon the Appellant 
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for a period extending forward eighteen years fron the birth of 
the child. 
Stated otherwise, the district court would respond in a way 
that wou:d automatically thwart the very purpose of the Juvenile 
court Act, which is rehabilitative of youth. 
On the other hand, should the juvenile court be allowed to 
exercise its jurisdiction, then the juvenile court would bring 
unique expertise and resources to the case. As mandated by statute 
(§78-3a-39, U.C.A. (1953)), the juvenile court might devise and 
apply a wide variety of dispositions, all in accordance with the 
perceived best interests of both the Appellant and society. Quite 
possibly, the court might require Appellant to shoulder his "civil 
responsibilities" and support the offspring. But unlike the 
district court, the juvenile court would not impose a procrustean, 
pecuniary formula. It would also consider the long adult life 
ahead of the Appellant; it would weigh the imposition of longterm 
civil amends against their likely effect on Appellant's psyche 
and future. 
Stated otherwise, the juvenile court would not respond in a 
way that would automatically thwart the intent of the Uniform Act 
on Paternity. 
Thus, juLisdiction in the instant matter should be placed in 
the juvenile court. 
H. Implicit legislative policy militates in favor of extending the 
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juvenile court's jurisdiction to the Appellant. 
Nowhere has the Utah legislature clearly announced an intent 
that parenthood occurring in a child should be treated with the 
same mechanical, monetary concerns that are applied to adult parents. 
Nowhere has the Utah legislature clearly announced an intent 
that the disorders of juvenile crime are to be resolved by special-
ists with the goal of rehabilitation; whereas the disorders of 
juvenile sexuality are to be resolved precisely like those of adults. 
Nowhere is there a clear basis to believe that the Utah legis-
lature would intend the following disparate results. A disturbed 
fifteen-year-old boy rapes a fifteen-year-old girl. That boy may 
avoid criminal penalties and be rehabilitated by the juvenile 
justice system (pursuant to Section 78-3a-25, U.C.A. (1953)). A 
second, equally disturbed fifteen-year-old boy "makes love to" and 
impregnates the same fifteen-year-old girl. The second boy, abso-
lutely and without fail, must now bear the civil, non-punitive 
responsibility of supporting the offspring during a period of 
eighteen years following the birth, until that second boy has become 
a thirty-four-year-old man. 
On the contrary, the Utah legislature has made it its business 
to distinguish juveniles from adults in matters of sexuality. 
Recently, that same legislature has prohibited juveniles--and 
juveniles alone--from either receiving contraceptives or having an 
abortion unless their parents are informed. It is obvious that 
the legislature intends that, in matters of sexuality, juveniles 
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are to he treated differently--and therefore separately. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah legislature intended that violations of the Uniform 
Act on Paternity are to be tried, exclusively and originally, in 
the juvenile court. It is not "elsewhere provided by law" that 
the juvenile court is not to resolve such matters; for to assert 
that proposition would be to subvert the spirit and purposes of 
the Juvenile Court Act. 
DATED this 9th day of May, 
J 
175 South West Temple, Su 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 9th day of May, 1983, I caused to be 
hand delivered to copies of Appellant's Brief to Sandy Mooy, 
attorney for respondent, at 431 Sou Lake City, 
Utah, 84111. 
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